China’s military anti-corruption campaign has entered a new and highly significant phase. According to Chinese state media, a military court on May 7, 2026, handed down first-instance verdicts against two former defense ministers: Wei Fenghe, former member of the Central Military Commission, former State Councilor, and former Minister of National Defense; and Li Shangfu, also a former member of the Central Military Commission, former State Councilor, and former Minister of National Defense.
Wei Fenghe was convicted of accepting bribes, while Li Shangfu was convicted of both accepting and offering bribes. Both men were sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, deprived of political rights for life, and had all personal assets confiscated. The verdict also stated that once their suspended death sentences are reduced to life imprisonment after the two-year period, they will remain imprisoned for life without the possibility of sentence reduction or parole.
This ruling shows that China’s recent purge of senior military officials has moved beyond disciplinary punishment, removal from office, and expulsion from the Communist Party and the military. It has now entered the stage of severe judicial sentencing. Under China’s legal system, a “death sentence with a two-year reprieve” usually does not mean immediate execution. In most cases, if the person does not commit further serious offenses during the reprieve period, the sentence is reduced to life imprisonment. However, in major corruption cases, courts can impose life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or sentence reduction after the reprieve period ends.
Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu both once held one of China’s most prominent military posts. Wei served as Minister of National Defense from 2018 to 2023. Li succeeded him in March 2023, but his time in office was unusually short. He disappeared from public view only months later and was formally removed from his positions in October 2023.
The downfall of both men had been foreshadowed. In June 2024, the Chinese Communist Party announced that Wei and Li had been expelled from the Party and that their cases had been transferred to military prosecutors. Wei was accused of seriously violating political discipline, using his position to benefit others, and accepting huge sums of money and property. Official statements also accused him of severely damaging the political environment of the military.
Li Shangfu’s case involved both bribery and the offering of bribes. Chinese authorities said he had used his position to seek improper benefits for himself and others, accepted large amounts of money and property, and offered bribes to gain improper advantages. He was also expelled from the military and stripped of his rank as general.
The significance of these cases lies not only in the fact that both men served as defense ministers, but also in their former positions within the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military leadership body. Their punishment sends a clear message that even the most senior military figures are not immune from prosecution.
In recent years, China’s military anti-corruption campaign has focused heavily on the Rocket Force, weapons procurement, and defense equipment systems. Wei Fenghe spent much of his career in the Second Artillery Force and later the Rocket Force, while Li Shangfu previously headed the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department. These areas are highly sensitive because they involve China’s missile forces, strategic deterrence capabilities, and massive military procurement budgets.
As a result, the cases against Wei and Li are not simply personal corruption scandals. They also point to deeper problems within China’s military governance, procurement system, and command structure.
Since 2026, the purge within China’s military has continued to expand. Senior officers from different branches of the People’s Liberation Army have reportedly been removed from their posts, reflecting an ongoing effort by Xi Jinping to strengthen political loyalty and tighten control over the armed forces.
For Beijing, the heavy sentences against Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu serve as a strong warning to the military: even former defense ministers and Central Military Commission members can face the harshest punishment if accused of corruption. For outside observers, however, the repeated downfall of senior generals also highlights serious internal tensions within the People’s Liberation Army, especially in areas related to weapons procurement, the Rocket Force, and political loyalty.
In the short term, this campaign may help Xi Jinping further consolidate control over the military. But in the long run, frequent purges at the top of the armed forces could affect morale, command stability, and the pace of China’s military modernization.
The sentencing of Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu is therefore more than just the conclusion of two corruption cases. It is a key symbol of the changing power structure inside China’s military, the political use of anti-corruption campaigns, and the broader transformation of China’s defense governance.
